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Director of Central Intelligence

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Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates

Liaison Channels

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REFERENCES: a. Memorandum of 14 February 1950 from AD/OCD to DCI, subject as above

b. Memorandum of 28 March 1950 from AD/OSO to DCI, subject as above

1. AD/ORE has been requested to comment on reference a. Briefly, reference a states that AD/OSO, AD/OO and AD/OCD agreed some months ago that no CIA intelligence or information should thereafter be sent to the [redacted] without advice to OSO and that no new categories of information should be given [redacted] without prior OSO concurrence. The aim of this agreement was stated to be "to prevent impairment of OSO's bargaining power". In reference a is attached a letter of 9 January 1950 from the [redacted]

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[redacted] presenting the opinion of [redacted] that "any approach to the Central Intelligence Agency for intelligence should be direct from himself to Admiral Hillenkoetter and that any material furnished in reply to his requests should come through [redacted]". Further [redacted] suggested this arrangement as the basis for all correspondence of a policy or general nature between the two organizations and recommended that this channel be used for formal demands for intelligence. On the working level, however, he supports an extension of the method for exchange of views presently used between D/FE (CIA) and [redacted].

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2. The stated purpose of the agreement among the AD/OSO, AD/OO and AD/OCD was "to prevent impairment of OSO's bargaining power". Reference b presents a strong case for the use of such an approach and advances a recommendation to abandon the long-standing practice of passing CIA intelligence directly to [redacted] in favor of its formal dissemination via [redacted].

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support of this recommendation it must be conceded that retention of the present procedure tends to strengthen the position of [redacted] with possibly a related disadvantage to [redacted] office.

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3. On the other hand it smacks of tail wagging the dog to stop CIA-level exchange of top intelligence with [REDACTED] in order to enhance the prestige [REDACTED] Further, such a change in procedure would constitute an affront to [REDACTED] which is certainly not desirable. And finally, it is believed that the present Washington exchange system: 25X1X7 25X1A6a 25X1X7

a. Gives positive assurance that CIA high-level estimates get to the right persons in [REDACTED] 25X1X7

b. Permits us to ask in exchange for the [REDACTED] papers which are extremely important to ORE. 25X1X7

c. Facilitates close working level relations which, again, ORE feels to be highly desirable.

d. Leaves OSO the bargaining lever of intelligence peculiar to its functions and such material as NIS production, which it distributes [REDACTED] 25X1A6a

4. Impairment of OSO's position [REDACTED] can, it is felt, be avoided simply by keeping OSO informed of what goes to [REDACTED] With this knowledge, OSO can approach [REDACTED] on the basis that certain information on intelligence has been furnished them at a stated time and place and that in return certain material would be appreciated. OSO has only to advise of non-cooperation and pressure can be exerted at CIA level. However, withholding of finished intelligence in this manner would be a last-resort solution and one under which ORE would stand to lose if [REDACTED] retaliated. 25X1A6a 25X1X7 25X1X7

5. Therefore, it is recommended that:

a. The long-standing Washington channel be continued for the exchange of high level intelligence and correspondence of a policy or general nature as favored by [REDACTED] 25X1X7

b. That OSO be kept informed of intelligence so furnished [REDACTED] 25X1X7

c. That OSO use this information freely to stimulate a flow of information and intelligence into its [REDACTED] 25X1A6a

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d. That the nature of OSO relations with [REDACTED] should 25X1X7  
normally be confined to covert intelligence matters, but that  
no change be made in present use of OSO channels for the transmittal  
of materials such as the HHS series.

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e. That CIA cooperate fully with [REDACTED] on extension of working  
level agreements such as that now operating between D/EE and [REDACTED] 25X1X7

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THEODORE BABBITT

ORE - S/PP

[REDACTED] 25X1A9a

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Distribution:

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